Την Παρασκευή 8 Δεκεμβρίου 2017, είχαμε την χαρά να παρακολουθήσουμε την παρακάτω ομιλία του αποφοίτου μας δρ. Άρη Φίλου-Ράτσικα, διδάκτορα του Πανεπιστημίου του Aarhus, και μεταδιδακτορικού ερευνητή στο Πανεπιστήμιο της Οξφόρδης.
Τίτλος: Walrasian Dynamics in Multi-unit Markets
Abstract: In a multi-unit market there exist multiple units of a good posted for sale among a set of buyers with monetary endowments. While a Walrasian equilibrium does not always exist in this model, natural relaxations of the concept that retain its desirable fairness properties do exist. We study the dynamics of (Walrasian) envy-free pricing algorithms in this environment, showing that for any such pricing algorithm, the best response dynamic process converges to a pure Nash equilibrium with small loss in revenue and welfare. Moreover, these bounds carry over to all Nash equilibria for a large class of (monotone pricing) algorithms.